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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The petitioner, who was the defendant in a personal injury action, was
seeking indemnification pursuant to section 193(a) of the Civil Practice Act
which permits a defendant to implead a third party in the original law suit.
Since the petitioner was served a summons over 90 days after the claim arose,
it made an application to the Supreme Court for an extension of the time limit
under section 50(e) (5) of the General Municipal Law. That section gives the
court discretion to extend the time for notice for a reasonable period after
90 days. However in order to exercise this discretion, the applicant must be
an infant or mentally or physically incapacitated.: The Supreme Court ruled that
these were the only conditions upon which the application could be granted.
This was affirmed by the Appellate Division.4 The Court of Appeals held that
the lower court was correct in denying the application and further stated as
dictum that notice was not necessary in a third-party indemnification action.
The Court of Appeals gave no arguments to sustain this position but it
seems to have made a valid assumption. Section 50(e) of the General Municipal
Law makes no provision for a third-party action and the legislative intent of the
statute is to give the public corporation adequate opportunity to investigate
the facts while readily available.'
"A statute requiring that notice of claim be given prior to institution of
action against a public corporation should be construed in the light of its
underlying purpose and such a statute is not a trap to catch the unwary or
ignorant."
If notice is required and section 193 (a) of the Civil Practice Act is barred,
the purpose or intent of section 50(e) of the General Municipal Law would be
defeated. The petitioner would have to wait for a judgement against it before it
could give a notice of an indemnity claim. This could take many years and the
public corporation would have a very difficult time acquiring facts. Thus, the
statute would operate as a hindrance, rather than an aid to public corporations.
Municipal Disposal Of Garbage-Governmenfal Funcfion
In Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor7 the Court held that
a village was not restricted by its zoning restrictions when using residentially
zoned land for the purpose of storing vehicles used by the police force, highway
3. Rudolph v. New York, 191 Misc. 947, 77 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
4. 1 A.D.2d 976, 151 N.Y.S.2d 86 (2d Dep't 1956).
5. Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d 397, 398 (1952);
Sweeney v. City of New York, 225 N.Y. 271, 273, 122 N.E. 243, 244 (1919).
6. Sandak v. Tuxedo Union School District No. 3, Town of Tuxedo, 308 N.Y.
226, 124 N.E.2d 295 (1954).
7. 2 N.Y.2d 190, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957).
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department, and in the collection of garbage, for the village was performing
a governmental function.
A village is restricted by its zoning restrictions when performing a
proprietary function, but not so when performing a governmental one.8 If the
functions are governmentail, the village may store and maintain vehicles necessarily
used in performing thdse functions.9 The issue in this case thus resolved itself
into whether the furnishing of a police force, the maintenance of a highway
department, and the collection of garbage were of a proprietary or governmental
nature.
The distinction between a proprietary and governmental act of a municipality
is whether the municipality is exercising its private rights as a corporate body
and performing a proprietary function, or is exercising the legislative mandate
related to a public duty generally and performing a governmental function.10
Prior to this case it had already been well established that furnishing a police
force was a governmental function," and that maintenance of a highway
department was a governmental function.12 Thus, appellant had no real basis
for challenging the proposed transgression of the zoning ordinance by the village
with regard to these uses. With regard to the remaining use, appellant did have
a positive basis for challenging the village for in the lower courts a conflict
existed as to whether disposal of garbage by a village constituted a proprietary
function' or a governmental one.' 4 The Court corrected the inconsistency by
holding that collection of garbage is a governmental function. The basis of the
Court's decision was that the preservation of the well-being and health of the
community places a duty upon the village to assure the collection and disposal
of garbage, and that performance of this duty is a governmental function.
It is common knowledge that accumulated garbage can breed diseases. Since
such diseases are detrimental to the health and well-being of people living in the
crowded living conditions of a typical modern village, it is reasonable to place
the duty of assuring the collection of garbage upon the village and hold that a
governmental function is being performed when such duty is being performed.
8. Village of Larchmont v. Town of Mamaroneck, 239 N.Y. 551, 147 N.E.
191 (1924); Oaks Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 221, 99 N.E. 540 (1912).
9. Stiger v. Village of Hewlett Bay Park, 283 App. Div. 827, 129 N.Y.S.2d 38

(2nd Dep't 1954).
10. O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgh,

239 App. Div. 555, 268 N.Y. Supp. 173 (2nd
Dep't 1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935).
11. Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933); Augustine v. Town of
Brant, 249 N.Y. 198, 163 N.E. 732 (1928).
12. People v. Grant, 306 N.Y. 258, 117 N.E.2d 542 (1954); Markey v. County
of Queens, 154 N.Y. 675, 49 N.E. 71 (1897).
13. O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgh, supra note 10.
14. Hewlett v. Town of Hempstead, 3 Misc.2d 954, 133 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup.
Ct. 1954), a'rfid, 1 A.D.2d 954, 150 N.Y.S.2d 922 (2nd Dep't 1956), motion for Zeave
to appeal denied 1 N.Y.2d 643, 154 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1956).

